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IN RE BABY: BLESSING OR PROBLEM CHILD? 
 
 
Jacob Baggett1 
 
  
“I got into this because the O’Briens needed my help. I 
never wanted a baby, but now . . . I just wish I could hold 
him in my arms, and never let him go.” 
 
Major Kira to Odo, discussing her surrogacy, Star Trek: 
Deep Space Nine: Season 5, ep. 12, “The Begotten” 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
From legal and sociological perspectives, surrogacy 
arrangements, along with the accompanying contracts, remain 
hot topics of debate.  In addition to a colorful body of 
jurisprudence, a New York Times article from September 2014 
reported a story in which intended parents attempted to bribe a 
Connecticut surrogate to undergo an abortion procedure after 
having learned the developing fetus had heart and brain 
defects as well as a cleft palate.2 Refusing to either accept the 
                                                          
1 Jacob Baggett, Juris Doctor (2015) and former Editor-in-Chief of the 
Lincoln Memorial University Law Review.   
2 Tamar Lewin, Surrogates and Couples Face a Maze of Laws, State by 
State, N.Y. TIMES, September 17, 2014, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/18/us/surrogates-and-couples-
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bribe or undergo the abortion procedure, the surrogate fled to 
Michigan, where surrogacy contracts are illegal.3  
The birth certificate listed the surrogate as the child’s 
mother, despite the fact the surrogate had no genetic 
connection with the child.4 Eventually, a family with other 
special-needs children adopted the child.5 The New York Times 
article also provided several state-by-state diagrams which 
illustrated the complex legal landscape concerning surrogacy, 
aptly calling it a “maze.”6 Tennessee’s lack of statutory 
guidance regarding surrogacy issues creates one of the dead 
ends within this nationwide maze.  
Since the mid-1990’s, the Tennessee General Assembly 
has remained entrenched in neutrality with regard to issues 
surrounding surrogacy.  In 2014, the Tennessee Supreme Court 
(the “Court”) realized its obligation to address these matters.  
While calling for legislative action, the Court addressed several 
surrogacy issues in In re Baby (“Baby”),7 such as subject matter 
jurisdiction, public policy considerations of surrogacy 
contracts, and terms the parties’ surrogacy agreement may 
legally contain. Of these issues, the most heavily emphasized 
was public policy.   
Part One of this note discusses the relevant surrogacy 
arrangement terminology and outlines key statutes and cases 
detailing the nationwide legal maze of surrogacy. Part Two 
discusses the facts giving rise to Baby, the sources of Tennessee 
law examined, and the Court’s analysis and holdings in Baby. 
Finally, Part Three examines Louisiana’s legislative efforts as a 
case study exhibiting the various difficulties legislatures may 
experience when addressing surrogacy issues. These difficulties 
may lead a state’s highest court to determine it has an 
obligation to act. The Tennessee Supreme Court did.    
 
                                                                                                                             
face-a-maze-of-laws-state-by-state.html?smprod=nytcore-
iphone&smid=nytcore-iphone-share&_r=0.  The article was published 
one day before the Tennessee Supreme Court released its opinion in 
In re Baby). 
3 Id.; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 7.22.851- .863 (West 2013).  
4 Id. 
5 Id.  
6 Id. 
7 In re Baby, M2012-01040-SC-R11JV, 2014 WL 4815211 (Tenn. Sept. 18, 
2014).  
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PART ONE: BACKGROUND 
 
I. TERMINOLOGY OF SURROGACY AGREEMENTS 
 
This note concerns two types of surrogacy 
arrangements: traditional8 and gestational.9 Traditional 
surrogacy arrangements involve a woman, the surrogate 
mother, whose egg is fertilized by means of artificial 
insemination and the surrogate mother carries the fetus until 
birth for the benefit of another.10 On the other hand, a 
gestational surrogacy arrangement involves the intended 
mother supplying her egg to be transferred, housed, artificially 
inseminated, and the fetus carried to term by another woman, 
the surrogate mother.11 Gestational surrogate mothers have no 
genetic connection with the fetus.12 However, in traditional 
surrogacy arrangements, the surrogate mother and the fetus are 
genetically connected.13 It is this genetic connection which often 
ignites legal flames because the corresponding rights, if 
extinguished, must occur by proper legal procedure.14  
 A number of legal commentators have professed that 
gestational surrogacy “has rendered traditional surrogacy 
obsolete and unnecessary.”15 So, why do people continue to 
                                                          
8 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1582 (9th ed. 2009); see also In re C.K.G., 
173 S.W.3d 714, 720 (Tenn. 2005). 
9 See In re F.T.R. 833 N.W.2d 634, 643 (Wis. 2013); 7 Samuel Williston, 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 16:22 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th 
ed. 1992 & Supp. 2013); Christen Blackburn, Note, Family Law—Who Is 
A Mother? Determining Legal Maternity in Surrogacy Arrangements in 
Tennessee, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 349, 352 (2009) (also identifies and 
defines donative surrogacy which involves creating an embryo from 
the genetic contribution of one intended parent with that of an 
unknown donor’s egg or sperm). 
10 See In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d at 720. 
11 See id.  
12 Id. 
13 See id. 
14 See Baby, 2014 WL 4815211 at *5. 
15 Weldon E. Havins & James J. Dalessio, Reproductive Surrogacy at the 
Millennium: Proposed Model Legislation Regulating “Non-Traditional” 
Gestational Surrogacy Contracts, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 673, 690 (2000).  
IN RE BABY: BLESSING OR PROBLEM CHILD?  7 
 
enter into traditional surrogacy arrangements when the 
gestational counterpart completely avoids the legal issues 
regarding the unborn’s genetic connection with the surrogate 
mother?  The reasons are numerous.  
First, artificial insemination, the medical procedure 
utilized in traditional surrogacy,16 is a relatively simple 
procedure which may be performed in the home.17 The 
procedure involves using sperm, typically of the intended 
father, to impregnate the surrogate mother.18 As a result, it is 
significantly less expensive than in vitro fertilization, the 
procedure used to initiate a gestational surrogacy.19  The low 
cost and relative convenience of artificial insemination make it 
an attractive method for many surrogates and intended 
parents.20  
Second, there are high success rates among surrogates 
with proven fertility, and the time between a failed artificial 
insemination attempt and the time another attempt may be 
made is a matter of weeks.21  Conversely, in vitro fertilization, 
the time between implantation attempts often takes months.22 
Third, perhaps the most pertinent benefit of the traditional 
arrangement is the safety of both the mother and the unborn.23 
“The main risk to the [gestational] surrogate comes from the 
                                                          
16 Intrauterine (Artificial) Insemination (IUI), 
http://www.nyufertilitycenter.org/infertility_treatment/artificial_in
semination (last visited Oct. 26, 2014).  
17 Gestational vs. Traditional Surrogacy: A Comparative Study, 
http://www.surrogatemothers.org/ gestational-vs-traditional-
surrogacy-a-comparative-study (last visited Oct. 21, 2014). 
18 Id.  
19 Gestational vs. Traditional Surrogacy, supra note 16.  
20 Ashok Agarwal & Shyam S. R. Allamaneni, Chapter 36: Artificial 
Insemination, Section 6: Infertility and Recurrent Pregnancy Loss (Jan. 
23, 2007), 
http://www.clevelandclinic.org/ReproductiveResearchCenter/.../ 
agrach019.pdf.  
21 Id. 
22 Id.  
23 The Center for Bioethics and Culture Network, Drugs Commonly 
Used for Women in Gestational Surrogacy Pregnancies, 
http://breeders.cbc-network.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/Drugs-Commonly-Used-for-Women-in-
Gestational-Surrogacy-Pregnancies.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2014). 
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pregnancy itself, especially if she is required to carry multiple 
babies[.]”24  
Additionally, gestational surrogates are administered a 
cocktail of prescription medications not involved in traditional 
arrangements.25 Some of these medications come with 
potentially significant side effects.26 In preparation for embryo 
transfer, the surrogate is administered hormones which inhibit 
the brain from secreting the natural hormones that control the 
menstrual cycle.27 “The woman is put into a ‘medical 
menopause,’ so that the ovaries stop functioning and her 
menstrual cycle can be completely controlled[.]”28 One of these 
hormones, Lupron, carries a Category X classification, which 
causes harm to the fetus if the surrogate mother becomes 
pregnant while taking the medication.29 Despite the potential 
side effects of the medications, the desire for genetic linkage 
between the child and the intended parents is a compelling 
reason why gestational surrogacy is chosen over a traditional 
arrangement.30 
 
II. FOREIGN STATUTES AND CASES 
 
Foreign Statutes 
 
                                                          
24 Id. 
25 Id.  
26 Id.  
27 Id. (Gonadotropin releasing hormone (GnRH) agonists like Synarel 
or Lupron. Lupron is administered by injection while Synarel comes 
in a nasal spray). 
28 Id.  
29 Id.    
30 The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Ethics 
Committee Opinion Number 397, Surrogate Motherhood, p. 2, 
http://www.acog.org/~/media/Committee%20Opinions/Committe
e% 20on%20Ethics/co397.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20140324T1309556802 (last 
visited Oct. 21, 2014). [Eds. note: The American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists issued Committee Opinion Number 
660 replacing Committee Opinion Number 397, 
http://www.acog.org/Resources-And-Publications/Committee-
Opinions/Committee-on-Ethics/Family-Building-Through-
Gestational-Surrogacy]. 
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Some contracts cannot be enforced due to their illegal 
nature.31 The word “illegal” in contract law has a broader 
meaning than simply contracts made for a criminal purpose.32 
“Illegal in the contract setting means . . .  [that] the contract or 
clause involved is void as a matter of public policy, whether or 
not technically criminal.”33 As a matter of public policy, a 
contract or contractual term will be nullified if the arrangement 
violates the precepts of the society in which the court sits.34 
Approximately one-third of state legislatures have 
provided statutory guidance regarding surrogacy contract 
formation and enforceability.35 Of the legislatures that have 
spoken, three “camps” have formed.36 In the first camp of 
states, all types of surrogacy contracts are prohibited.37 One 
state even provides criminal penalties for forming such an 
arrangement.38 The second prohibits traditional surrogacy 
contracts.39 Finally, the third camp allows both traditional and 
gestational surrogacy contracts, subject to various regulations 
and specified limitations.40 Tennessee’s current surrogacy laws 
do not fit within any of these three established camps.41 
Instead, the current Tennessee statute essentially consists of a 
definition ending with an interpretational caveat found in the 
                                                          
31 Thomas D. Crandall & Douglas J. Whaley, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND 
MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 620 (6th ed. 2012). 
32 Id. 
33 Id. (noting this potentially powerful theory is often forgotten by 
attorneys). 
34 See id. 
35 Baby, 2014 WL 4815211 at *8. 
36 Id. 
37 See, e.g., D.C. CODE §§ 16-401(A)-(B), -402(a) (West 2013); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 7.22.851- .863 (West 2013); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 
122 (surrogate parenting contracts declared contrary to the public 
policy of the state). 
38 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 7.22.851- .863 (West 2013).  
39 See, e.g., N.D. CODE §§ 14-18-05, -08 (West 2013); IND. CODE ANN. § 
31-20-1-1(West 2013); NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.580 (2013) (limits 
applicable to gestational, rather than traditional surrogacy 
arrangements).  
40 See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:1 to – B:32 (West 2013); VA. 
CODE ANN. §§ 20-156 to 20-165 (West 2013); WASH. REV.  CODE ANN. 
§§ 22.26.210- .260 (West 2013). 
41 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-102(48)(A-C) (West 2014).  
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statutory section entitled “Adoption.”42 The statute provides 
that: 
 (48)(B) “Surrogate birth” means: 
(i) The union of the wife’s egg and the 
husband’s sperm, which are then 
placed in another woman, who carries 
the fetus to term and who, pursuant to 
a contract, then relinquishes all 
parental rights to the child to the 
biological parents pursuant to the 
terms of the contract; or  
(ii) The insemination of a woman by 
the sperm of a man under a contract by 
which the parties state their intent that 
the woman who carries the fetus shall 
relinquish the child to the biological 
father and the biological father’s wife 
to parent; 
(B) No surrender pursuant to this part is 
necessary to terminate any parental rights of 
the woman who carried the child to term 
under the circumstances described in this 
subdivision (48) and no adoption of the child 
by the biological parent(s) is necessary; 
(C) Nothing in this subdivision (48) shall be 
construed to expressly authorize the surrogate 
birth process in Tennessee unless otherwise 
approved by the courts or the [G]eneral 
[A]ssembly.43 
 
The Tennessee Supreme Court was not the only court which 
found itself without statutory guidance regarding surrogacy 
issues.  
 
Cases in Other Jurisdictions 
 
 In the absence of guiding statutes, several well-known 
cases dealing with surrogacy contracts have arisen in 
jurisdictions other than Tennessee.  Some state courts have 
                                                          
42 Id.  
43 Id. 
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focused on whether a surrogacy contract embodies a traditional 
or gestational surrogacy arrangement.44 
 In Johnson v. Calvert, the California Supreme Court held 
gestational surrogacy contracts “differ[] in crucial respects from 
adoption[.]” 45 As a result, the monetary exchange, meant to 
compensate the surrogate for her services in gestating the fetus 
and undergoing labor, detailed within the gestational 
surrogacy contract was distinguishable from the California 
adoption statutes prohibiting payment for consent to adopt a 
child.46  
In reaching that conclusion, the California Supreme 
Court pointed to the fact that the surrogacy arrangement was 
entered into prior to the child’s conception, and as discussed 
above, the definition of gestational surrogacy rendered the 
surrogate without genetic connection to the child.47 Therefore, 
the surrogate was not vulnerable to financial inducements to 
part with “her own expected offspring[,]” an element of  the 
prohibitive California adoption statute48 at issue.49 
Furthermore, the California Supreme Court was not persuaded 
by the argument that such contracts violate the public policy of 
California because the surrogate based her argument on the 
same prohibitive statute the court had just distinguished and 
thereby, rendered inapplicable.50  
The Supreme Court of Ohio went a step further in J.F. v. 
D.B.51 by holding that the public policy of the state remained 
uncrossed by gestational surrogacy contracts, even when a 
provision of the contract requires the gestational surrogate to 
refrain from asserting parental rights so long as the child was 
generated from another woman’s egg.52 After quickly 
dispensing with the issue at hand, the Ohio Supreme Court 
curiously used the final breath of its opinion to predict what it 
saw as an imminent traditional surrogacy question by stating: 
                                                          
44 See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).  
45 Calvert, 851 P.2d at 784. 
46 Id. 
47 Id.  
48 CAL. PENAL CODE § 273 (West).  
49 Calvert, 851 P.2d at 784. 
50 Id. 
51 J.F. v. D.B., 879 N.E.2d 740 (Ohio 2007). 
52 Id. at 741- 42.  
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[W]e would be remiss to leave unstated the 
obvious fact that a gestational surrogate, whose 
pregnancy does not involve her own egg, may 
have a different legal position from a traditional 
surrogate, whose pregnancy does involve her 
own egg. This case does not involve, and we 
draw no conclusions about, traditional 
surrogates and Ohio's public policy concerning 
them.53 
 
In contrast, other state courts have articulated a blanket 
prohibition on surrogacy contracts.54 In Doe v. New York City Bd. 
of Health, Mrs. Roe agreed to serve as a gestational surrogate for 
her sister, Mrs. Doe, who had been unable to bear children as a 
result of cancer.55 “No consideration, except love and affection, 
[was] involved.”56 Prior to birth, Mrs. Roe and her husband 
sought judgment that the named biological parents should 
appear on each of the resulting triplet’s birth certificates, and 
the New York City Board of Health and the New York City 
Department of Health & Mental Hygiene (“DOHMH”) objected 
when it answered that doing such would violate New York’s 
Domestic Relations Law.57  
The DOHMH conceded that it would not oppose the 
post-birth amendment of the birth certificates, provided Mr. 
and Mrs. Doe established they were genetic parents of the 
triplets or the formal adoption proceedings were completed.58 
Mr. and Mrs. Doe were unwilling and proceeded with their 
pursuit of favorable rulings on their pre-birth motions.59 As a 
final answer to those motions, New York’s Superior Court held 
that any “surrogacy parenting contract is prohibited and 
unenforceable in [New York], even where no payment of funds 
is involved . . . . Domestic Relations Law makes no distinction 
                                                          
53 Id. at 742. 
54 See, e.g., Doe v. New York City Bd. of Health, 782 N.Y.S.2d. 180 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004).  
55 Id. at 182.  
56 Id.  
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 183. 
59 See id.  
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between gestational surrogacy contracts and traditional 
surrogacy arrangements[.]”60  
Moving from cases involving gestational arrangements 
to those dealing with traditional ones, in Surrogate Parenting 
Assocs., Inc. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong,61 the Kentucky 
Supreme Court held that traditional surrogacy contracts do not 
violate the state’s statute prohibiting the buying and selling of 
children,62 commonly known as “baby-selling statutes.”63 The 
court’s articulated distinction rested on the fact that the 
agreement to bear the child was entered into before conception, 
and as result, the expectant, biological mother is free from 
external “financial inducements to part with the child.”64 The 
court elaborated: 
 
The essential considerations for the surrogate 
mother when she agrees to the surrogate 
parenting procedure are not avoiding the 
consequences of an unwanted pregnancy or fear 
of the financial burden of child rearing. On the 
contrary, the essential consideration is to assist a 
person or couple who desperately want a child 
but are unable to conceive one in the customary 
manner to achieve a biologically related 
offspring. The problem is caused by the wife's 
infertility. The problem is solved by artificial 
insemination.65 
 
In In re F.T.R., the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that, 
aside from the termination of parental rights, traditional 
surrogacy contracts are enforceable under Wisconsin law as 
long as the agreement is in the “best interest” of the child.66 The 
termination of parental rights by the parties’ private contract 
was unenforceable because the surrogate had not consented to 
                                                          
60 Id. at 183 (citing N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122 (McKinney 2014).  
61 Surrogate Parenting Assocs., Inc. v. Commonwealth ex rel. 
Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986).  
62 Id. at 211.  
63 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 (West 2014).  
64 Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d at 211.  
65 Id. at 211-12.  
66 In re F.T.R., 833 N.W.2d 634, 638 (Wis. 2013). 
14                     4 LMU LAW REVIEW 1 (2016) 
 
that contractual provision, and no basis for the involuntary 
termination of rights existed.67 
The legal issues presented in Tennessee’s Baby are most 
aligned with the textbook case of In re Baby M.68 In that case, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court held that traditional surrogacy 
arrangements were contrary to the State’s public policy based 
on its adoption, custody, and termination of parental rights 
statutes.69 Initially, the New Jersey trial court, at the conclusion 
of a thirty-two-day trial, held that the adoption, custody, and 
termination of parental rights statutes were inapplicable to 
surrogacy contracts because the “Legislature did not have 
[those type of contracts] in mind when it passed those laws, 
those laws were therefore irrelevant.”70 The New Jersey 
Supreme Court disagreed and held the provisions at issue “not 
only directly conflict[ed] with New Jersey statutes, but also 
offend[ed] long-established State policies.”71 
Other than, perhaps, identifying the pulses of the 
nation’s state courts and legislatures willing to speak to the 
relevant issues, the preceding cases have little authoritative 
weight because the issue of public policy requires the 
Tennessee Supreme Court to examine and weigh various 
sources of public policy of the state in which it sits. Thus, for 
the purposes of the issue of public policy, Tennessee law exists 
in a vacuum.  
 
PART TWO: IN RE BABY 
 
I. FACTS 
 
 A man (the “Intended Father”) and woman (the 
“Intended Mother”) (collectively “Intended Parents”), both 
Italian citizens who were unable to have children, turned to a 
surrogate (the “Surrogate”), a Tennessee resident, for aid.72 The 
parties, both represented by legal counsel, contracted into a 
traditional surrogacy arrangement where the Surrogate, who 
                                                          
67 Id. at 640. 
68 In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).  
69 Id. at 1240.  
70 Id. at 1237-8.  
71 Id. at 1240.  
72 Baby, 2014 WL 4815211, at *1.  
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supplied her own egg, was artificially inseminated by the 
Intended Father’s sperm.73 The Surrogate became pregnant in 
April of 2011.74 During the pregnancy, the Intended Parents 
paid the Surrogate approximately $42,000 in medical expenses 
and legal fees.75 The Surrogate also received an additional 
$31,000 for pain, suffering, and miscellaneous pregnancy and 
birth-related expenses.76  
Prior to the birth of the child, all parties filed a joint 
petition asking a Tennessee juvenile court to declare the 
Intended Father as the genetic father of the child, grant custody 
to the Intended Parents, and terminate the parental rights of the 
Surrogate.77 The petition was granted.78 Less than a month 
later, the Surrogate gave birth to a girl (the “Child”).79  
The Intended Parents were present at the Child’s birth.80 
Following professional medical advice, all agreed the Surrogate 
would breastfeed the Child for a short period of time.81 Soon 
after the birth, the Intended Mother returned to Italy to care for 
her ailing parents.82 The Intended Father, however, remained 
with the Surrogate to assist in the daily care of the Child.83  
 A week after birth, the winds shifted.84 The Surrogate 
had bonded with the Child.85 Consequentially, the Surrogate 
sought an emergency ex parte restraining order and injunction 
which claimed that “the birth of [the] Child did not meet the 
requirements of ‘surrogate birth’ under Tennessee law” 
because the Intended Parents had not yet married, a 
requirement which implicitly appears necessary under the 
                                                          
73 Id. at *2.  
74 Id. at *4.  
75 Id.  
76 Id. 
77 Id.  
78 Id.  
79 Id. at *5. 
80 Id.  
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 See id.  
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relevant statute because it uses terms such as “husband” and 
“wife.”86  
The Surrogate asked the sitting magistrate to vacate the 
order in which she had waived her parental rights, grant her 
temporary custody, and enter an injunction prohibiting the 
Intended Parents from removing the Child from the 
jurisdiction.87 The same day motions were filed, the magistrate 
conducted a hearing.88 At the conclusion of the hearing, the 
magistrate denied the Surrogate’s motion for injunctive relief 
and ordered the Surrogate to relinquish physical custody of the 
Child to the Intended Father.89  
Three weeks later, the Surrogate returned to the 
magistrate’s court.90 That day, the Intended Parents were 
married in Williamson County.91 The Surrogate filed motions 
seeking to set aside the order waiving her rights.92 After the 
second hearing, the Surrogate’s motions were, again, denied.93 
She turned to the juvenile court, which affirmed the 
magistrate’s decision.94 The Surrogate then appealed the 
juvenile court’s ruling to the Tennessee Court of Appeals.95  
The Surrogate’s argument was fourfold.96 She argued 
that the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction; the 
surrogacy contract was invalid based on the unmarried status 
of the Intended Parents at the time of contracting;97 the 
proceeding which terminated her parental rights was improper 
due to lack of counsel at the proceedings; and the juvenile court 
should have set aside the magistrate’s custody order because 
                                                          
86 Id. (citing language used in Surrogate’s “Emergency. . .  Ex Parte 
Restraining Order and Injunction).  
87 Id.  
88 Id.  
89 Id.  
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at *6.  
96 Id.  
97 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-102(48)(A)–(C) (2014) (labels such as 
“husband” and “wife” are used; however, this statutory definition 
refers to a gestational surrogacy, not a traditional one as is at issue in 
Baby).  
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the magistrate failed to conduct a “best interest” analysis.98 The 
Court of Appeals rejected each of the Surrogate’s arguments.99 
These issues were accepted by the Tennessee Supreme Court as 
matters of first impression.100  
 
II. SOURCES OF LAW EXAMINED IN BABY 
 
The public policy concern of traditional surrogacy 
contracts is the main issue in Baby. Curiously, neither the 
Surrogate nor the Intended Parents raised or preemptively 
answered this contractual defense. Instead, the Court raised the 
defense sua sponte.101 The Tennessee General Assembly, 
through a commission, last addressed major surrogacy issues in 
1993; however, no substantive action was taken on this 
relatively new topic.102 Surrogacy issues remained stagnant 
until 2014 when the Tennessee Supreme Court granted Baby 
discretionary review under Tennessee Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 11.103 When the Tennessee Supreme Court 
confronted the public policy issue, the Court drew from many 
sources of state law.104  
First, Tennessee’s traditional principles of contract law 
were considered.105 “Contract law in Tennessee plainly reflects 
the public policy allowing competent parties to strike their own 
bargains.”106 Tennessee also recognizes several common law 
contract defenses, including fraud,107 duress,108 undue 
influence,109 mistake,110 and incapacity.111 Surrogacy contracts 
                                                          
98 Baby, 2014 WL 4815211 at *9. 
99 Id. 
100 Id.  
101 See Baby, 2014 WL 4815211 at *10. 
102 See id. 
103 Id.  
104 Id. at *11. 
105 Id. at *20.  
106 Id. (citing Ellis v. Pauline S. Sprouse Residuary Trust, 280 S.W.3d 
806, 814 (Tenn. 2009)). 
107 Id. (citing Rawlings v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 78 S.W.3d 
291, 297, 301 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). 
108 Id. (citing Rawlings, 78 S.W.3d at 301). 
109 Id. (citing 78 S.W.3d at 297, 301). 
110 Williams v. Botts, 3 S.W.3d 508, 509-10 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).  
111 McMahan v. McMahan, 2005 WL 3287475, *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).  
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are not free from these common law defenses, and each defense 
may be raised in an independent declaratory judgment 
action.112 These defenses were inapplicable to the case at hand, 
and the Court held that “none prohibit the enforcement of 
traditional surrogacy agreements on public policy grounds.”113 
Second, the Court noted the neutrality of Tennessee’s 
statute regarding surrogacy.114 The statute, previously cited, 
amounts to a definition coupled with an interpretational 
caveat.115 Save subsection (C), which expressed the Tennessee 
General Assembly’s neutral stance, this statutory definition 
provided little help to the Court.116 Further lessening its 
relevance was the fact that this definition describes a 
gestational surrogacy, not a traditional one, as in Baby.117 The 
interpretational caveat to the statute states that none of the 
provisions “shall be construed to expressly authorize the 
surrogate birth process in Tennessee unless otherwise 
approved by the courts or the [G]eneral [A]ssembly.”118 The 
Court analyzed the statute in In re C.K.G., determining that the 
statute’s caveat expressed a neutral “legislative stance” with 
regard to the enforceability of surrogacy arrangements not 
memorialized by written contract.119 The Court could not 
interpret these neutral statutes to express unfavorable policy 
with regard to surrogacy arrangements.120  
The Court next considered Tennessee’s so-called “baby-
selling” statutes.121 Such statutes provide criminal penalties for 
illegal payments in connection with the surrender of a child or 
the placement of a child for adoption.122 The Court agreed with 
other cases and commentary123 distinguishing surrogacy 
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arrangements as payment “for the services of a surrogate in the 
conception of a child[,]” rather than payment for the surrender 
of the child.124 However, the Court held that “[c]ompensation 
may not be contingent upon the surrender of the child or the 
termination of parental rights, and compensation is restricted 
to the reasonable costs of services, expenses, or injuries related 
to the pregnancy, the birth of the child, or other matters 
inherent to the surrogacy process.”125 
 The Court continued by discussing Tennessee’s custody 
statute and relevant cases which include the proverbial “best 
interest” determination. If all are applicable, there are fifteen 
statutorily-enumerated factors that a judge must consider when 
making a “best interest” determination.126 No such 
determination was made in the case of Baby, because the 
juvenile court ruled the surrogacy contract’s waiver of such 
rights was proper under Tennessee law.127 The Court 
disagreed.128  
The Court held that the state’s obligation to make such a 
determination could not be relieved by a provision of private 
contract.129 In fact, the Court had previously decided the matter 
in Tuetken v. Tuetken.130 As a result, the Court held the term to 
be improper and unenforceable.131 
Consequentially, the Court scrutinized statutes 
involving legal parents and the methods that parental rights 
may be terminated.132 In Tennessee, a woman may be properly 
termed a “legal parent” in two ways: being “[t]he biological 
mother of a child,”133 or being “[a]n adoptive parent of a 
                                                                                                                             
Surrogate Mothers Be Compensated for Their Services?, 6 WHITTIER J. 
CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 529, 547(2007); Stacy Christman Blomeke, Note, 
A Surrogacy Agreement That Could Have and Should Have Been Enforced: 
R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790 (Mass. 1998), 24 U. DAYTON L. REV. 513, 
529 (1999). 
124 Baby, 2014 WL 4815211 at *14. 
125 Id. at *15. 
126 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-106 (West 2014).  
127 Baby, 2014 WL 4815211 at *5. 
128 Id. at *15. 
129 Id. 
130 Tuetken v. Tuetken, 320 S.W.3d 262, 272 (Tenn. 2010).  
131 Baby, 2014 WL 4815211 at *16. 
132 Id. at *17. 
133 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-102(28)(A) (West 2014).  
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child[.]”134 In Baby, the Surrogate was the biological mother of 
the child, and thus, is the “legal parent” of the Child under 
Tennessee law.135  
Under Tennessee law, legal parent’s rights may only be 
terminated in one of three ways.136 First, if a statutorily valid 
ground for termination exists and termination of the biological 
mother’s parental rights is in the “best interest” of the child, an 
involuntary termination may be initiated.137 Second, a 
biological mother may voluntarily extinguish her rights by 
signing a “surrender,” a document which provides “that [a] 
parent or guardian relinquishes all parental or guardianship 
rights of that parent or guardian to a child, to another person or 
public child care agency or licensed child-placing agency for 
the purposes of making that child available for adoption[.]”138 
Finally, when a mother consents to adoption, her parental 
rights may be terminated as part of the adoption proceeding.139 
While the Court held these statutes did not evidence any public 
policy against the enforcement of surrogacy arrangements, the 
Court did hold that the termination of the Surrogate’s parental 
rights through private contract was unlike any acceptable 
method of termination and thus, the term was unenforceable.140 
 
III. BABY’S HOLDING & EPILOGUE 
 
 The Court held that traditional surrogacy arrangements, 
including the one at issue, did not violate the public policy of 
the State of Tennessee.141 However, the private “best interest” 
determination and the private termination of parental rights of 
the traditional surrogacy contract were improper.142 Thus, the 
Court affirmed the Court of Appeals with regard to the public 
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policy issue, vacated the juvenile court’s termination of the 
Surrogate’s parental rights, and remanded the case to the 
juvenile court to determine visitation and child support.143  
Although the record is unclear as to the exact date the 
Intended Father exercised and took physical custody of the 
Child,144 an interview with the Surrogate’s attorney, Shelley 
Breeding, revealed that the Intended Father reclaimed physical 
custody of the child the evening following the magistrate’s 
denial of the Surrogate’s emergency ex parte restraining order 
and injunction.145  
On September 18, 2014, the day the opinion was issued, 
the Child was nearly three years old and resided with the 
Intended Parents in Italy,146 and the Child continued to reside 
in Italy as of December 15, 2014.147 The attorney for the 
Intended Parents, Benjamin Papa, and the attorney for the 
Surrogate, Shelley Breeding, stated that they were 
communicating with their respective clients to determine how 
each wanted to proceed in light of the Court’s unexpected 
analysis and holding.148 As a result of the Court’s unexpected 
public policy analysis and holding, no motions by either side 
had been filed with the juvenile court to which the case was 
remanded.149 
 
PART III: LEGISLATIVE DIFFICULTY 
 
I. JUSTICE KOCH’S CONCURRENCE 
 
Justice Koch, in his concurring opinion, agreed with the 
other members of the Court to the extent that the contract at 
issue, save the two invalidated provisions, did not violate the 
public policy of the State of Tennessee. However, he disagreed 
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with the holding that traditional surrogacy contracts do not 
violate the Tennessee’s public policy, generally.150 In his view, 
the Court should have tailored its holding to the facts of the 
case, refrained from pronouncing a general rule, and thereby, 
deferred the general rule to legislative determination.151 Justice 
Koch stated:  
 
[t]he legal rules governing [surrogacy in 
Tennessee] are ambiguous, if not non-existent, 
and they need to be clarified . . . . While the 
desire to bring some order to the ambiguity is 
commendable, the case-by-case approach the 
courts must use is less effective in circumstances 
like this than the far more dynamic ability of the 
General Assembly to address . . . Tennessee’s 
acceptance or rejection of surrogacy contracts as 
a matter of public policy[.]152   
 
Surrogacy in Tennessee is “big business[,]”153 and the 
need for clear guidance is undoubtedly great and growing,154  
and the Court emphatically called for legislative action.155 
However, one could argue the narrow holding Justice Koch 
advocates would provide a great deal of the needed clarity 
while simultaneously relieving the Court of the responsibility 
of determining the public policy of Tennessee regarding 
surrogacy as well as and any resulting political backlash.156  
Justice Koch’s concurrence would provide sufficient 
boundaries for practitioners to guide their clients through the 
traditional surrogacy contract formation process, (i.e., this 
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contract term is proper and enforceable, and this one is not).157 
In addition, the narrow holding would show the Court passed 
on opportunity to declare a general rule, effectively 
demonstrating the Court’s powerful reluctance to be the 
governmental branch which invalidates such agreements.158 As 
a result, practitioners and citizens of Tennessee would need 
only watch (or advocate in) one governmental branch, the 
Tennessee General Assembly, for a general rule, and in the 
meantime, they may carry on aiding their clients, intended 
parent(s) or surrogate, through the surrogacy process.159 
Of course, there is no guarantee the General Assembly 
will expressly and clearly address the topic soon or ever. Since 
the General Assembly last spoke to the issue in the mid-1990’s, 
it has had approximately twenty annual opportunities to 
address the topic.160 However, a history of legislative inactivity, 
even coupled with a likelihood of future inactivity, perhaps, 
does not obligate a state’s highest court to announce a general 
rule.161 In footnote twelve of his concurring opinion in Baby, 
Justice Koch states:  
 
[T]he courts’ response to legislative inaction, 
whether inadvertent or intentional, should 
always be tempered by the admonition in Article 
II, Section 2 of the Constitution of Tennessee that 
persons belonging to one branch of government 
should avoid exercising the powers properly 
belonging to the other branches. The better 
course at this juncture would be accredit the 
presumption, albeit rebuttable, that the members 
of the General Assembly, like other public 
officials, will discharge their duties in good 
faith.162  
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To save the Court from public and political backlash, 
one could further argued that a court so high in the judicial 
system should be wary of expressing an opinion beyond what 
may be required, even if such an opinion would please a 
significant segment of the population.163 The immediate judicial 
outcomes should not “solely be evaluated according to their 
apparent desirability.”164 “Instead, decisions should also be 
evaluated according to their institutional legitimacy, their 
jurisprud[ential] soundness, and finally, the manner in which 
these decisions will affect and interact with both [the] U.S. 
government and society.”165 
Regarding the Baby decision, the immediate judicial 
outcome is that traditional surrogacy contracts expressly 
withstand public policy scrutiny.  Lawyers who practice in a 
directly or indirectly related field find it desirable.  Lawyers 
dealing with surrogacy contracts also gain a great deal of 
guidance with which they will use to guide their clients.  
Additionally, future surrogates in traditional arrangements are 
protected by the invalidity of contractual terms that deprive 
them of parental rights by private agreement, and proponents 
of surrogacy gained a much-desired legal victory which will set 
heavy precedent for an entire state.  
Next, institutional legitimacy and jurisprudential 
soundness appear to be intertwined. Unlike the legislative 
branch, the judiciary’s power is predicated on its ability to find 
support for a decision, i.e., its ability to base its decision on pre-
existing law, whether it be statutory, case law, or a mixture of 
several sources.  Without a base of precedent or fair 
interpretation of an existing statute, the judicial decision and, 
by extension, the issuing court’s legitimacy may be questioned. 
In Baby, the Court found, cited, and fairly evaluated 
many relevant sources of state law, including the Tennessee 
Constitution, relevant Tennessee statutes, Tennessee cases, and 
sources of contract principles adopted in Tennessee cases.  
Thus, having tethered its decision to a collection of existing 
law, the Court’s answer and its legitimacy as body are unlikely 
to be questioned by the reasonable critic.  Furthermore, it is 
unlikely that the Baby decision will cause inter-governmental 
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acrimony because the opinion takes no power from the 
Tennessee General Assembly.  It can do what it has always had 
the power to do—pass laws detailing the requirements for 
valid surrogacy contracts within the state. Indeed, the Court 
encouraged the legislature to make a definitive statement on 
the issue.  
As far as the decision’s effect on society, the impact is 
much more speculative.  The polar options are either that it has 
no effect, or that overnight, surrogacy becomes a politically-
charged banner issue causing many state election swings 
during the next cycle.  In reality, it is likely to be somewhere in-
between. In any event, the citizens of Tennessee, through their 
representatives, will have an opportunity to speak.  
The argument against the Court’s broader holding 
would conclude by stating that legislative inaction is 
sometimes a consequence of living in a democracy.  What is the 
cause of legislative inaction regarding surrogacy? Perhaps 
surrogacy-related problems are not high on the agenda of the 
citizens of Tennessee.  If surrogacy-related issues were as 
pressing as commentators claim, legislative efforts, such as 
those in Louisiana, may be more likely to occur.  
 
 
II. LOUISIANA’S LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS 
 
 The Louisiana State Legislature recently attempted to 
comprehensively address its surrogacy issues; however, its 
struggles exemplify the difficult position in which courts are 
placed when waiting on adequate legislative guidance. 
Louisiana State Representative Joseph Lopinto, R-Metairie, 
filed House Bill 187 on February 17, 2014.166 Louisiana State 
Senator Gary Smith, D-Norco, sponsor of the corresponding 
Senate Bill, is the father of two children born through 
gestational surrogacy arrangements that were formed and 
signed outside Louisiana.167 Senator Smith said the Bill helps 
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families become complete.168 He continued, "[i]nfertility is so 
private and personal, and . . . this Bill would . . .  help[] (parents 
with fertility problems) to be able to have a biological child of 
their own" within Louisiana.169  
After sailing through the Louisiana House Committee 
on Civil Law and Procedure with a 10-0 vote, the Louisiana 
House passed the Bill with a vote of 80-14.170 The Louisiana 
Senate Judiciary Committee then picked up the Bill.171 
Following the adoption of amendments, the Senate Judiciary 
Committee passed the Bill with a vote of 22-11.172 Barely any 
resistance was encountered on the Senate floor during the 72-7 
vote.173  
 One of the first provisions declares traditional 
surrogacy contracts, termed “genetic surrogacy” contracts 
within the Bill, “absolutely null.”174 First, the Bill mandates that 
gestational surrogacy contracts shall be written.175 After 
memorialization, the contract must be signed by the 
“gestational mother,” the gestational mother’s husband, if 
applicable, and the intended parents.176 With such an uncertain 
statutory requirement, one could argue that the Bill would 
exclude single parents from legally contracting with a 
surrogate.177 
Second, the Bill states that the gestational surrogacy 
contract is enforceable only if the contract is approved by a 
court “in advance of in utero embryo transfer[.]”178 The 
surrogate must be at least twenty-five and no older than thirty-
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five years old179 and have previously given birth to at least one 
child.180 Next, the Bill forbids the surrogate from receiving 
compensation for her services.181 Compensation, as defined in 
the Bill, means “a payment of money, objects, services, or 
anything else having monetary value.”182 However, 
compensation does not include reimbursement of actual 
expenses183 to the gestational mother or payment for goods or 
services incurred by the intended parents as a result of the 
pregnancy.184 If the contract is for “compensation,” the contract 
“shall be absolutely null and unenforceable in the state of 
Louisiana as contrary to public policy.”185 
Furthermore, the Bill would prohibit a contractual term 
requiring the gestational mother to consent to terminate the 
pregnancy “for any reason[.]”186 “Any reason” includes 
prenatal diagnoses of actual or potential disability, impairment, 
genetic variation, or any other health condition, gender 
discrimination, and “for the purposes of the reduction of 
multiple fetuses.”187 
After the Bill received bicameral affirmation, it reached 
the desk of Governor Bobby Jindal, who sought counsel from, 
most notably, Reverend Gene Mills, President of the 
conservative Christian non-profit organization called Louisiana 
Family Forum.188 Reverend Mills “told his contact within the 
administration, ‘I could not advise Bobby sign this bill.’”189 
Reverend Mills cited two “irreconcilable differences” which led 
to his advisement that Governor Jindal veto the bill.190  
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To Reverend Mills, the in vitro fertilization process 
involved in gestational surrogacy births generated the first 
irreconcilable difference.191 According to Reverend Mills, the 
destruction of excess fetuses was “[t]echnically . . . abortion.”192 
However, the Bill expressly makes a contractual term requiring 
the surrogate to have such excess fetuses removed 
unenforceable, while saying nothing about the surrogate 
consenting to such a procedure in the absence of the 
contractual requirement to do so. In an interview, Reverend 
Mills confirmed that this outside-the-contract circumvention is 
where his first concern with the legislation stemmed.193 
Reverend Mills said he questioned how effectively this 
provision would be enforced stating that the “police arm, 
especially within the [in vitro fertilization] industry” is simply 
not there.194 
The second irreconcilable difference Reverend Mills 
cited was the language of the statute that was intended to 
prevent "commercial surrogacy," i.e., when a surrogate is paid 
to carry the child.195 The Reverend “believed [that the] 
restrictions he requested be written into the Bill to ban 
surrogacy-for-pay were insufficient.”196 This so-called 
irreconcilable difference is more difficult to understand 
because, again, the Bill expressly prohibits such a term.197 
Reverend Mills elaborated during an interview by stating “the 
[surrogacy for-pay] restrictions were too vague.”198 He 
continued by expressing concern that “[i]n such new area of the 
law, such vague language could be a detriment . . . to altruistic 
surrogacy[,]” or surrogacy done for no pay or reimbursement 
of expenses.199  
 Reverend Mills, and perhaps others, counseled 
Governor Jindal to veto the Bill, and the Bill was officially 
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vetoed on May 30, 2014.200 The veto pushed the issue back to 
the legislative realm for a potential supermajority override; 
however, Louisiana Representative Joe Lopinto, the bill’s 
sponsor, surrendered just two days after Governor Jindal’s 
veto.201 Despite the overwhelming support in both houses, 
Representative Lopinto decided not to attempt to override the 
Governor’s veto because such an action would place the 
funding of other bills in jeopardy.202 
Representative Lopinto’s loss in the final legislative leg 
has not deterred Louisiana lawmakers, who envision 
surrogacy-related legislation on the horizon.203 The Bill’s failure 
to secure the Governor’s signature notwithstanding, the 
deliberative process succeeded when a constructive, in-depth 
discussion took place.  A similar discussion may happen within 
the Tennessee General Assembly if the concern of the citizenry 
were high enough. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Save the complex custody determination, child support 
calculation, and parenting plan for the immediate parties, the 
Tennessee Supreme Court’s holding in Baby is relatively 
uncontentious.  The Court grappled a difficult legal question, 
a task with which it is familiar. After predicating its power on 
an assemblage of existing law, reasonable questions of 
jurisprudential soundness and institutional legitimacy are 
non-existent.  The decision is unlikely to stir inter-
governmental hostility, and properly, the opinion fervently 
calls for legislative action.  
The nearly successful legislative efforts of Louisiana 
exhibit the frustration some may have with the deliberative 
process.  Preemptory legislative action regarding hotly-
contested social issues is a rarity.  In Baby, the Court, after 
documenting twenty years of legislative action and strongly 
noting the damage such prolonged inaction was causing, saw 
its obligation clearly — to prevent further damage.  
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